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A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Blackmun declares, “the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not include the unborn.”1 In support, he references the use 
of person in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the appearance of ‘person’ 
in other parts of the body of the Constitution and its Amendments.2 The 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment begins “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens.”3 The due process clause 
states “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,”4 and 
the equal protection clause “nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”5 This first section, and the comment in its 
entirety, asserts Justice Blackmun’s interpretation of ‘person’ excluding the 
unborn under the Fourteenth Amendment ignores the philosophical and legal 
conclusions of the Founders of the United States of America, legislative action, 
and biological facts. 
The second section explores the legal definition of ‘person’ under the 
Constitution of the United States, drawing from Roe, an amicus appellate brief, 
legal precedent, and state legislative action. The amicus curiae brief for the 
appellee, submitted by the Association of Texas Diocesan Attorneys 
(“Diocesan Attorneys”), states: “The great issue in this case is whether the 
unborn child or foetus is a person within the meaning of the constitutional 
safeguards of the person contained in the Constitution of the United States, and 
especially in its Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Ninth Amendments.”6 
In framing their argument, the Diocesan Attorneys asserted the concept of 
‘person’ utilized in the Constitution and its first ten Amendments clearly 
included the unborn.7 Regarding philosophy, the Diocesan Attorneys’ brief in 
 
 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
 2. Id. at 157. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
 6. Brief for Ass’n of Tex. Diocesan Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 7, 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 134282 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae 
Brief]. 
 7. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing the framers of the Constitution 
considered the unborn child the subject of rights which included the right to life and a duty on the 
part of society and the child’s parents to care for and support the unborn child) 
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Roe asserted the concept of ‘person’ in the Constitution and first ten 
Amendments included the unborn because of the religious motivation, 
philosophy of natural rights, and the views of the framers and adopters of the 
Constitution.8 In contrast, the holding espoused by Justice Blackmun concludes 
all the instances where ‘person’ appears in the Constitution applies only post-
natally, or after birth.9 
The third section illustrates that certain areas of the law provide the unborn 
with protections despite the holding in Roe. It has been posited the application 
of Justice Blackmun’s personhood definition has mistakenly denied the unborn 
non-Fourteenth Amendment rights and limited the discretion of American 
lawmakers in characterizing personhood.10 In California and other states, 
statutes criminalize the nonconsensual killing of an “unborn child” as murder 
or manslaughter, implying a definition for ‘person’ incongruous with that laid 
out by Justice Blackmun in Roe.11 States continue to enact variations on fetal 
and pregnant woman assault.12 Under most inheritance and trust laws the 
unborn are considered a ‘person’, despite no such consideration under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.13 This continuing response by the states implies at 
least a form of emerging awareness in regard to the rights afforded to the 
unborn. 
Lastly, the fourth section covers biological and moral evidence supporting 
the arguments provided by the Diocesan Attorneys, the appellee brief by Henry 
Wade, and the states, all of whom see something worth protecting despite the 
holding in Roe. Within the Diocesan Attorneys’ brief, the proposition was 
declared “Life begins, not at birth, but at conception”, applying scientific 
methods of the day.14 Modern science confirms the biological identity of a new 
human individual is already constituted in the zygote resulting from 
fertilization.15 Rule of law and rule by law is briefly examined in reference to 
 
 8. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). 
 10. Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn’s 
Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 258 (1982). 
 11. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 598–99 (Cal. 1994) (including Arizona, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah, and the Judges of the California Supreme Court 
concluded “when the mother’s privacy interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine 
whether, and at what point, it should protect life inside a mother’s womb from homicide”). 
 12. See Monthly State Update: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 2014, Pregnancy and Birth, 
Fetal and Pregnant Woman Assault, GUTTMACHER INST., (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.gutt 
macher.org/statecenter/updates/december.html#assault. 
 13. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 257. 
 14. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 65 (a conclusion formed by Professor R. Ashley 
Montagu citing ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776–1791 119–
218 (1955). 
 15. WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE GIFT OF HUMAN LIFE 34 (3rd ed. 
2013). 
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the Casey decision succeeding Roe. Lastly, Evangelium Vitae, a Catholic 
Church document, is referenced for its position that every innocent human 
being possesses a right to life.16 
This comment asserts ‘person’ under the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
the unborn through support from the appellee briefs, reference to the thinking 
of the Founders, common law and legislative precedent, current state 
approaches concerning the unborn, and persuasive evidence of biology and 
philosophy. Depriving the unborn of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
yet recognizing laws beyond the Fourteenth Amendment protecting the 
unborn, has established an untenable dichotomy. The Supreme Court must 
recognize the rights of all persons under the Constitution. 
II.  THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF PERSONHOOD 
A. Roe, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitutional Articles 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment references ‘person’ three times: 
first in the requirements for a citizen, second in the due process clause, and 
third in the equal protection clause.17 The phrase “persons born” makes a sole 
appearance in reference to the requirements for citizenship of the United States 
and of the state where said ‘person’ resides.18 The due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment mention ‘person’ without 
born as a descriptor.19 Textually, this implies “persons born” is in reference to 
the requirements for citizenship, not that a Constitutional ‘person’ requires 
birth. 
Justice Blackmun holds, however, ‘person’ only ever operates post-natally 
in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution at large.20 References by 
the Justice include the requirements for representatives and senators in Article 
I, and the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-Second Amendments.21 The sections 
where ‘person’ is mentioned in the Constitution seemingly affirm this post-
natal status. For example, “No person shall be a Representative who shall not 
have attained the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a citizen of 
the United States.”22 However, a pre-natal definition was argued by the 
Diocesan Attorneys in their amicus curiae brief in Roe. 
 
 16. Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Evangelium Vitae, VATICAN.VA (Mar. 25, 1995) point 71, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evan 
gelium-vitae.html. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3–4. 
 20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). 
 21. Id. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
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B. As the Founders Intended 
An appellee brief written by the Texas Diocesan Attorneys asserted as an 
originalist argument: “The concept of the person utilized in the Constitution of 
the United States and in its first ten Amendments had a well-defined meaning 
for those who framed and adopted their provisions that clearly included the 
unborn child.”23 
To achieve this point, the Diocesan Attorneys pointed out rules of the 
Constitution must be considered “rules for the government of courts.”24 The 
Diocesan Attorneys argued that this included rules of the Constitution 
safeguarding the ‘person’, including its appearances in the Fifth, Fourteenth, 
and Ninth Amendments.25 As a result, the Court in Roe would be tasked with 
determining the appropriate meaning of person “used by the framers of the 
Constitution in establishing its fundamental safeguards of the person.”26 
It is noted that the people of the United States, including John Adams and 
Thomas Jefferson, were so greatly concerned at the lack of a bill of rights 
guaranteeing the freedom of the person that the Federalists agreed to propose 
and submit a comprehensive Bill of Rights at the First Congress in 1789.27 The 
Diocesan Attorneys insisted the religious motivation, philosophy of natural 
rights, and views of the ‘person’ on the part of the framers and adopters of the 
Constitution could not be disregarded by the Court.28 Boyd v. United States is 
cited where Justice Bradley declared: 
. . . constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be 
liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their 
efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in 
sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the 
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon.29 
The implication was that restricting who is covered by the word ‘person’ in the 
Constitution dangerously threatens the rights of the people. 
To further establish their originalist argument, the Diocesan Attorneys 
invoked James Wilson as an illustration. James Wilson helped formulate, voted 
 
 23. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 8. 
 24. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 9 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179–80 
for the proposition by Chief Justice Marshall “that the framers of the Constitution contemplated 
[the Constitution] as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.”). 
 25. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 9. 
 26. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 9. 
 27. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10. 
 28. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 29. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 12 (citing 116 U.S. 616, 635 where notice to 
produce an invoice and the law supporting such notice resulting in self-incrimination was ruled 
unconstitutional). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] A REEXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSON 395 
for, and signed the Declaration of Independence, participated in the 
Constitutional Convention, signed the proposed Constitution of the United 
States, and served as an Associate Justice for the Supreme Court of the United 
States.30 He was a professor of law at the College of Pennsylvania while 
serving on the Supreme Court, knowledgeable of the philosophy of natural 
law, and of a position to articulate the meaning and concept of ‘person’ 
generally shared by his fellow citizens, particularly as it was “woven into the 
sinews of the colonial and state Bill of Rights and finally into the Constitution 
of the United States.”31 
Justice Wilson commented “Persons are divided into two kinds – natural 
and artificial. Natural persons are formed by the great Author of nature. 
Artificial persons are the creatures of human sagacity and contrivance; and are 
formed and intended for the purposes of society.”32 The Constitutional Fathers 
did not see ‘person’ as something subject to man’s contrivance, like that of the 
corporation or state.33 The Diocesan Attorneys stressed the Founders saw “The 
status of person was not something to be conferred by the state or even all the 
people of the state”, a ‘person’ simply is and has being by virtue of an act of 
creation by God himself.34 
One of the most influential thinkers relied upon by the Founders, John 
Locke, expressed the view that men by nature being free, equal, and 
independent, cannot be put out of this state by another without his own 
consent.35 Essentially, a person, whether child or adult, was deemed superior to 
the state and to its law, even that of the Constitution.36 The original documents 
of the United States further make the relationship of man to the state clear. For 
example, the Declaration of Independence holds: 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit 
of Happiness . . . That to secure these rights Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .37 
As the Founders saw it, these rights were given by an authority greater than 
any manmade state, and the state existed by the grace of those whom it 
governed. In addition, if birth were seen as the beginning of life then they 
likely would have written “that all men are born equal.” 
 
 30. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 14. 
 31. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 14. 
 32. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 14. 
 33. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 15. 
 34. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 15. 
 35. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 18. 
 36. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 18. 
 37. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 19 (emphasis added in original). 
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Thomas Jefferson was familiar with the laws of England as far back as the 
Laws of King Alfred, which penalized the killing of a pregnant woman and 
that of her unborn child, requiring payment for the killing of both.38 This 
example and those listed above stand for the proposition that the Founders and 
colonial Americans respected and considered the unborn as persons created by 
God.39 This approach was drawn from English thinking, as was noted with 
John Locke, and also from William Blackstone who cited in his Commentaries, 
“Life. This right is inherent by nature in every individual, and exists even 
before the child is actually born.”40 
The Diocesan Attorneys observed a disregard for the “religious 
motivations, philosophy of natural rights, and the views of the person 
entertained by the framers and adopters of the Constitution . . .” is no basis to 
declare invalid the will of those who formed the foundation of the U.S. system 
of government, especially those parts which dealt with the safeguards of the 
person.41 Following from the interpretation in Boyd by Justice Bradley, 
constitutional provisions dealing with the security of persons should be 
liberally construed, requiring ‘person’ in the Constitution cover not just those 
already born but those yet to be.42 The Founders utilized natural law, which 
insists the natural person is a creation of God, not of man like a corporation 
would be, and this natural person exists before the arbitrary boundary of 
birth.43 Once a limit is placed on the protections afforded one group of persons, 
the protections for all are put in jeopardy. If rights are not based on something 
permanent and absolute then they are subjective, and in this subjective state 
they are vulnerable to the mutable nature of popular opinion. The Declaration 
of Independence recognizes we are “created equal”, and if the Founders of the 
United States thought otherwise they likely would have written we are “born 
equal.” 
C. As the Drafters Wrote 
Additionally, one can make a textual argument for the recognition of rights 
for the unborn. The Diocesan Attorneys assert in their appellee brief the 
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes the unborn child 
as a person.44 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “All persons 
born . . . in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
 
 38. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 22. 
 39. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 24. 
 40. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 24–25. 
 41. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
 42. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 27. 
 43. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 26; see also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 
15 (discussing corporation and natural law). 
 44. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 33. 
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of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”45 Discussion by the 
draftsman, John A. Bingham of Ohio, concerning § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment expressed: 
By that great law of ours it is not to be inquired whether a man is ‘free’ by the 
law of England; it is only to be inquired is he a man, and therefore free by the 
law of that creative energy which breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life . . . endowed with the rights of life and liberty.46 
This sentiment finishes, in words reminiscent of the Declaration of 
Independence, “Every man is entitled to the protection of American law, 
because its divine spirit of equality declares that all men are created equal.”47 
A central purpose of the Citizenship clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to make certain that black Americans, and every other class 
of person, obtained the rights of citizenship in addition to those natural rights 
they received upon conception from God.48 This purpose was considered so 
fundamental Representative William Lawrence of Ohio in 1866 believed it was 
unnecessary to put in writing, saying “This clause is unnecessary, but 
nevertheless proper, since it is only declaratory of what is the law without it.”49 
Even with the Citizenship clause explicitly written, Justice Blackmun found a 
means to disregard the draftsmen with a false analogy. He concluded because 
abortion practices were legal in some instances in the 19th century that ‘person’ 
could in no way include the unborn in the Fourteenth Amendment.50 This is 
similar to proposing that because many people believed for years the sun 
orbited the earth, that the view the earth orbited the sun is invalid on its face. 
Existence of a mistaken belief does not suffice as definitive proof against the 
right conclusion. 
The Diocesan Attorneys assert the Citizenship clause of § 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment fully includes the unborn, among others.51 “The 
unborn child is the ‘person’ before birth who, by virtue of being ‘born’ in the 
United States, becomes a citizen of the United States,” they write.52 As the 
unborn are included within the Citizenship clause, they too must be recognized 
to have the right to claim protection from the federal courts for their 
prospective status of citizenship upon birth.53 Otherwise, the present status quo 
arises, which was predicted by the Diocesan Attorneys in their brief. 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 46. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 33–34. 
 47. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 34 (emphasis added). 
 48. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 34. 
 49. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 34–35. 
 50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
 51. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36. 
 52. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36. 
 53. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
398 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:391 
If the unborn cannot obtain protection from their prospective status as 
citizens, then citizenship becomes a precarious right.54 Citizenship cannot be 
acquired by birth if a person is not allowed to be born.55 If the rights of 
citizenship are to be effectively protected, an unborn child must be recognized 
to possess a prospective right to citizenship.56 
The esteemed Court turned down the above reasoning in favor of an 
interpretation stating the obvious: ‘person’ does not indicate it has prenatal 
applications in the Constitution.57 References to ‘person’ by the Court include 
the requirements for Representatives and Senators in Article I, the Fifth, 
Twelfth, and Twenty-Second Amendments.58 For example, “No person shall 
be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of twenty five Years, 
and been seven Years a citizen of the United States.”59 The use of ‘person’ 
here indeed applies after birth, but it also does not apply to children or 
adolescents. Yet to conclude this section makes children and adolescents 
nonpersons because it does not refer to them would be entertained by no one. 
But this is exactly what Justice Blackmun concluded in Roe; because ‘person’ 
in the Constitution is referring to someone after birth, and only after, those 
before birth are not included in the definition of ‘person’.60 As citizenship 
rights activate upon birth, denying citizenship today is as simple as ending a 
pregnancy prior to labor. The Diocesan Attorneys recognized when they wrote 
their brief that the prospective right of citizenship had to be recognized, 
otherwise citizenship means nothing. 
III.  PERSONHOOD IN THE STATES 
Areas outside the Fourteenth Amendment frequently afford the unborn 
protections. This raises important questions. Foremost is why the unborn are 
afforded protection outside the Fourteenth Amendment, but within it they are 
subject to the determination of the mother? This section will attempt to show 
the inherent contradiction of law present where protections are provided in one 
area but denied in another. 
In To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn’s Potentiality of Life, it is 
presented that a misunderstanding of the Roe decision caused courts to 
mistakenly deny the unborn non-Fourteenth Amendment protections to which 
 
 54. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 36. 
 55. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 37. 
 56. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 37 (illustrating this argument using prospective 
jurisdiction of courts in judicial proceedings and the actions necessary to preserve that 
jurisdiction). 
 57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). 
 58. Id. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157. 
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they are entitled.61 The author, Professor Jeffrey Parness, summarizes the Roe 
Court’s position as treating the unborn not as persons in the whole sense, while 
recognizing the unborn can be treated as persons in many contexts.62 As 
support, he noted the Fifth Circuit concluded: 
An unborn child’s lack of status as a ‘person’ for Fourteenth Amendment 
purposes does not affect the status of an unborn child as a ‘child’ within the 
meaning of the [Social Security] Act; that a fetus is not constitutionally entitled 
as a person to claim certain benefits in no way affects the right or power of 
Congress to extend benefits to unborn children by appropriate legislation.63 
Even so, federal courts since Roe have failed to distinguish entitlement of 
benefits under the Fourteenth Amendment from the issue of extension of 
benefits to the unborn under other laws.64 State laws provide the best examples 
of this dichotomy, and though numerous state laws affect the unborn, states 
have not fully recognized the unborn due to misplaced reliance on the Roe 
decision.65 Areas of state jurisdiction include inheritance, trusts, criminal law 
and others.66 The authors stress these areas need to be addressed to promote 
policies affecting the unborn.67 
A. Inheritance and Property 
An individual in gestation at a decedent’s death is deemed to be living at 
the decedent’s death if the individual lives 120 hours after birth.68 Similarly, if 
the testator had no child living when he or she executed a will, an omitted 
after-born child receives a share in the estate equal in value to that the child 
would have received if the testator died intestate.69 Each of these sections of 
the Uniform Probate Code (“U.P.C.”) recognize the unborn connected to the 
intestate decedent or as the child of a testator, and vests rights in the unborn 
contingent upon their live birth.70 
Initially, this does not appear troubling as the argument can be made the 
state has no interest in transferring property to an unborn who will not be 
born.71 However, Parness highlights the state’s interest in promoting the 
 
 61. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 258. 
 62. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 261. 
 63. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263 (citing Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 
1974)). 
 64. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263. 
 65. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263. 
 66. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263. 
 67. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 263. 
 68. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (a)(2) (amended 2010). 
 69. Id. § 2-302 (a)(1). 
 70. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 264 (varying slightly in wording since Parness’ original 
publication, where the relevant statute was U.P.C. § 2-108, but the argument remains unaffected). 
 71. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265. 
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unborn’s potential for life may be undermined by treating their interest as 
contingent upon birth.72 Presumably, a wealthy, pregnant intestate might have 
substantial incentive to abort the unborn child she is carrying to establish her 
status as ‘surviving spouse’ to take the entire estate.73 The state has a 
legitimate interest in “protecting the potentiality of human life” which warrants 
an elimination of incentives to abort, especially since eliminating such an 
incentive does not place an obstacle in the way of a pregnant woman’s right to 
abortion.74 
While Parness concludes the state’s interest protects the potentiality of 
human life without interfering with a woman’s privacy right, this still ignores 
the larger issue. The appellee brief submitted by the Diocesan Attorneys 
argued the concept of property in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment primarily deal with state law.75 Because state law 
recognizes property rights for the unborn, the Due Process Clause of both the 
Amendments protect the unborn as a ‘person’.76 To provide otherwise 
establishes an irrational contradiction,77 one observable today. 
The handling exhibited by the U.P.C. above was inherited from the 
common law of England, and recognizes the unborn child’s ability to take by 
inheritance, dependent upon their birth.78 English courts recognized the 
unborn’s rights in property law as early as 1795, and American courts utilized 
a similar approach in Hall v. Hancock.79 Where it has been shown a state 
recognizes the unborn child may take real or personal property under will or 
statute of descent and distribution, there is a declaration the unborn is a 
‘person’ to be protected with respect to their property right.80 Prior to the 
holding in Roe, the Diocesan Attorneys insisted: 
If the unborn child is a person protected as to its property under the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
 
 72. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265. 
 73. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1)(A) 
(amended 2010), where an intestate share of a decedent’s surviving spouse is entire if no 
descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent). 
 74. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 265 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)). 
 75. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38. 
 76. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38. 
 77. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38. 
 78. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 38. 
 79. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 39 (citing Doe v. Clark, 2 H.B1. 399, 126 Engl 
Rep. 617 (1795) where the court held “children living at the time of [the life tenant’s] decease” 
included unborn children, and Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick, 255 (Mass., 1834) where Chief Justice 
Shaw held an unborn child fell within the meaning of a bequest to grandchildren “living at my 
decease”). 
 80. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 6, at 41. 
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of the United States, the child must also be a person under the same clauses for 
the purpose of the protection of its life and liberty.81 
They noted it would be a strange and bizarre doctrine that protected the 
property of the unborn child under these Amendments, but not its life and 
liberty.82 Life precedes liberty and property where it is listed in the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States,83 and life precedes liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the 
Declaration of Independence.84 It may be reasonably inferred life was to take 
the ultimate priority among these most important rights, for without life no 
other right matters. “Thus, if any lesser right of the unborn child is protected 
by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
foundational right to life of the unborn child must also necessarily be protected 
by them.”85 
Yet today it is seen that the unborn are recognized to inherit property,86 but 
receive no protections under the Fourteenth Amendment after Roe.87 It is truly 
a strange and bizarre doctrine the Court devised in Roe, where ‘person’ does 
not include the unborn, yet the unborn in areas of state law receive an interest 
in property. Naturally these are two different things, which justifies two 
different approaches. Or it is as the Diocesan Attorneys argued, that the unborn 
should be considered a ‘person’ for the protection of the life and liberty due a 
‘person’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?88 
B. Criminal Law 
The unborn is not a ‘person’ under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, having no right to life, liberty, or property since Roe.89 
Presumably, this leads one to conclude there is nothing of value prior to birth. 
Yet California defines murder as the unlawful killing of a human being, or a 
fetus, with malice aforethought.90 This applies wherever an act resulting in the 
death of a fetus is not a therapeutic abortion, committed by a holder of a 
physician’s or surgeon’s certificate to preserve the mother’s life, or where the 
act was consented to by the mother of the fetus.91 Fetus is separately listed 
from human being, implying these are two different things. But why then is the 
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crime of murder attached to the unlawful killing of a fetus? That implies a 
fetus is alive, because if nothing of value resides in a pregnant woman’s womb 
it makes no sense to penalize someone on two counts of murder. 
While Roe determined a state’s interest in protecting potential human life 
arose at viability,92 the state of California held viability was not an element of 
fetal murder.93 Previous cases in California made reference to viability 
concerning § 187 of the California Penal Code (“§ 187”), interpreting Roe’s 
stricture to mean only a fetus that had met the viability threshold could support 
a conviction for fetal murder.94 The Defendant in Davis argued because the 
fetus he killed could have been legally aborted under Roe it could not be 
protected under § 187.95 But the California Supreme Court elaborated Roe 
principles are inapplicable to a statute such as § 187 where killing a fetus 
without the mother’s consent is criminalized.96 The Court plainly stated, “The 
Roe decision, therefore, forbids the state’s protection of the unborn’s interest 
only when these interests conflict with the constitutional rights of the 
prospective parent.”97 And the Court concluded, “When the mother’s privacy 
interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine whether, and at what 
point, it should protect the life inside a mother’s womb from homicide.”98 
Interestingly, Roe causes confusion on the issue. As the Supreme Court of 
California said, state legislatures may determine when the life in the mother’s 
womb is protected from homicide absent the woman’s privacy interests. But if 
there is a life inside the womb, how is it permissible to end it? How is it a 
privacy right trumps a right to life? Indeed, the unborn is not a legal person, 
but a Supreme Court of a state here said a fetus was life. These confusions 
must be resolved. 
In People v. Taylor, the California Supreme Court reviewed a case where 
the appellate court reversed a second degree murder conviction based on the 
death of a fetus.99 The appellate court concluded the mental component of 
implied malice could not be met because the Defendant did not know his 
conduct endangered fetal life due to an unawareness the victim was 
pregnant.100 The California Supreme Court did not agree, commenting “There 
is no requirement the defendant specifically know of the existence of each 
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victim.”101 In past cases, the Court did not indicate a defendant was required to 
have a subjective awareness of his particular victims for an implied malice 
murder charge to proceed.102 The Court continued that nothing in the language 
of § 187 allowed for a different analysis for a fetus.103 Just as a gunman firing 
through closed doors of an apartment building would be held liable for the 
murder of all the victims struck by his bullets, so too would he be held liable 
for the death of a fetus if one of the victims happened to be pregnant.104 Again, 
despite the pronouncement in Roe that a fetus is not a ‘person’ under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,105 a State provides individuals may be charged with 
two counts of murder when a woman is pregnant and not exercising a privacy 
right. Where a defendant may be held responsible for the death of a fetus, 
despite the lack of Constitutional personhood via Roe, there is an implied value 
placed on the unborn.106 It seems a judicial system is out of synchronization 
with its constituencies when it announces the unborn have no fundamental 
rights to life, liberty, or property, and in the following days states find ways to 
circumvent the announcement. 
C. Emerging Awareness and the Majority Stance of the States 
It can be argued whether the unborn should be recognized as persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment is still an unsettled question forty-two years later. 
The Guttmacher Institute (“Institute”), originally formed within the corporate 
structure of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America,107 reports in the 
last four years states have enacted 231 abortion restrictions.108 Elizabeth Nash 
and her co-authors note 341 provisions aimed at restricting access to abortion 
were introduced in 2014 alone.109 And while the Institute recognizes 
legislatures in seventeen states introduced ninety five measures to expand 
 
 101. Id. at 884. 
 102. Id. (citing People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1981) where the defendant’s conduct, 
under the influence of alcohol, was sufficiently wanton to support two charges of second degree 
murder without any requirement that the defendant be subjectively aware of both victims). 
 103. Id. 
 104. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 884 (Cal. 2004). 
 105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
 106. Parness et al., supra note 10, at 298; Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status 
of an Unborn Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 931, 969 
(2000-2001). 
 107. The History of the Guttmacher Institute, GUTTMACHER INST., (Feb. 15, 2014), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/about/history.html. 
 108. Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2014 State Policy 
Review, GUTTMACHER INST., (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/ 
2014/statetrends42014.html. 
 109. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
404 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:391 
access to abortion,110 the large number of recently enacted abortion restrictions 
dramatically reshaped the landscape.111 
In 2000, thirteen states had four or five types of abortion restrictions in 
place, causing the Institute to deem them hostile to what they call abortion 
rights.112 In 2010, twenty two states were considered hostile to abortion rights, 
with five of those states having six or more restrictions, resulting in a label of 
extremely hostile.113 Ms. Nash and her colleagues reported in 2014, twenty 
seven states had enough restrictions to be considered hostile to abortion rights, 
with eighteen of those twenty seven being considered extremely hostile.114 
Twenty seven states make up more than half those in the entire Union. These 
twenty seven states possess stances against the widespread practice of the 
abortion privacy right protected in Roe. This is at least an emerging awareness 
of the value of unborn life since 2000, and now certainly a majority stance 
against what Roe declares. 
Variations on abortion restrictions include a value placed on prenatal life 
through fetal murder statutes as showcased above in California. California, 
however, is not the only state acting in this realm. In 2014, Colorado, Florida, 
and Minnesota enacted variations on fetal and pregnant woman assault.115 June 
of 2014 saw Colorado pass a measure allowing a woman to bring civil charges 
against a person responsible for the unlawful termination of her pregnancy at 
any point in gestation.116 At the same time, a Colorado bill provided exceptions 
for actions by the pregnant woman and medical care,117 meaning a woman, or 
abortion provider, may still obtain or provide an abortion and not be liable 
under the bill. It specifically prohibits granting personhood rights to a fetus, in 
line with the holding in Roe,118 yet still allows a woman to hold someone 
responsible for terminating a wanted pregnancy. This supports the odd 
approach the law has provided where the unborn are not persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, yet are given some forms of protection that push 
against, but do not infringe, upon the privacy right proclamation from Roe. 
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Florida enacted a similar measure, making it a crime to cause the injury or 
death of a fetus at any point of development, with exceptions for abortion, 
medical treatment, and actions by the pregnant woman.119 Florida’s fetal 
homicide law currently applies only to viable fetuses.120 But again, here is a 
state recognizing the essential holding of Roe while attempting to protect the 
unborn child. Yet Florida applies a definition outside the Fourteenth 
Amendment, making it a crime to injure or kill a fetus at least after the point of 
viability. Why is it a wanted unborn child is protected, but an unwanted unborn 
child may be aborted? Both situations terminate the pregnancy, but in one an 
individual potentially receives two counts of murder, while in the other the 
pregnancy is ended and the provider and once mother go separate ways with no 
legal sanction. 
Lastly, Minnesota’s governor signed into law a measure allowing 
individuals to be prosecuted for causing injury or death to a fetus while driving 
a vehicle negligently or under the influence.121 Even the pregnant woman is not 
explicitly exempted from prosecution under the law, which goes into effect 
August 1st of 2015.122 Again a state lines up with Roe, yet is providing 
whatever means it can around Roe’s holding to provide the unborn with some 
form of protection. It is apparent the law says the unborn are not persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but the treatment of the unborn outside the 
Fourteenth Amendment says otherwise. 
The twenty seven states enacting restrictions on abortion, and the examples 
of unborn life being valued by fetal murder statutes in California, Colorado, 
Florida, and Minnesota support the proposition that the unborn have a value, 
despite what the Supreme Court declared in 1973.123 Neither are these 
approaches unprecedented, as penalties for the death of a fetus long predate 
these contemporary examples. In English Common Law, upon which the 
United States’ system of law is based, during the lifetime of William 
Blackstone, legal protection of the fetus from homicide began at the 
“quickening”, when it was assumed life began for the unborn.124 Quickening 
was understood then, and now, as the first motion of the fetus in the uterus felt 
by the mother.125 Thirteenth Century writers Bracton and Fleta ruled killing an 
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unborn child where there was evidence of quickening was homicide.126 
Blackstone, Bracton, Fleta, and others repeatedly referred to the unborn as 
“child” and not “potential life”.127 Henry de Bracton in the Twelfth Century 
stated “If there is anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison 
which produces an abortion, if the foetus be already formed or animated, and 
especially if it be animated, he commits homicide.”128 
Everything which has been cited above supports value being placed on the 
unborn as possessing a life, or something worth protecting. If indeed it was 
widely believed the fetus were nothing other than a collection of cells there 
would not be twenty seven states restricting abortion, states among that 
number supporting fetal murder statutes for wanted pregnancies, and 
provisions providing the unborn to take under intestacy and property laws. 
This opposition is due to the fact the unborn possesses life from the moment of 
conception, existing as a distinct biological person. 
IV.  BIOLOGICAL AND MORAL DEFINITIONS OF PERSONHOOD 
Justice Blackmun wrote “justification [for the State’s duty to protect 
prenatal life] rests on the theory that a new human life is present from the 
moment of conception.”129 The existence of life from the moment of 
conception is also denied because of claimed “problems for precise definition 
of this view . . . posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to 
indicate that conception is a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event.”130 
Justice Blackmun confidently continues, “There has always been strong 
support for the view that life does not begin until live birth.”131 The Greek 
stoics’ medical knowledge is cited, as well as the prevailing belief for many 
centuries life did not begin until quickening.132 Again, belief that life did not 
exist prior to quickening is akin to the belief the sun revolved around the earth 
prior to Copernicus’ scientific discovery. This section will show scientific 
proof conception is not an ongoing event and that human life beginning at 
conception is not a theory. It will also show beliefs that life did not begin until 
quickening were factually inaccurate and insufficient as proof to conclude the 
unborn are undeserving of personhood. This is offered as a persuasive tool, 
because if it can be shown life exists prior to birth, which it does, supporting an 
argument denying the unborn rights becomes indefensible. 
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A. Biological Definitions 
To provide a framework for discussing what should constitute a ‘person’, it 
is necessary to delve into what can be shown through scientific knowledge. 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines person as “a human being”.133 
Determining what constitutes a human being is the next step. 
In the brief for the appellee, Henry Wade, it was argued, “From conception 
the child is a complex, dynamic, rapidly growing organism.”134 At fertilization 
a new and unique being is created unlike either parent.135 As early as seventeen 
days after implantation in the uterus, the unborn child has blood cells and 
possibly a heart.136 Development progresses from there, described by the 
Diocesan Attorneys in their brief as “a process of achieving, a process of 
becoming the one [the unborn] already is.”137 The unborn child is separate 
from its mother and, “however dependent it may be before birth–and for some 
years after birth–it is a living being, with its separate growth and development, 
with its separate nervous system and blood circulation, with its own skeleton 
and musculature, its brain and hearing and vital organs.”138 
The idea of legal separability [sic] from the mother for the unborn should 
begin where biological separability [sic] begins was expressed by a New York 
court in 1953.139 The Court expressed “That it [the unborn] may not live if its 
protection and nourishment are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its 
development is not to destroy its separability [sic]; it is rather to describe 
conditions under which life will not continue.”140 In essence, a two year old is 
not viable because it cannot feed itself. But this merely proves a two year old 
cannot provide for itself. This fact does not establish the two year old is not a 
human being or that it lacks personhood rights. 
The appellee brief, after making an extensive medical review of the 
unborn, insists on the conclusive nature of the humanity of the fetus.141 
“Quickening is only a relative concept” the brief notes, “which depends upon 
the sensitivity of the mother, the position of the placenta, and the size of the 
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child.”142 “The child is as much a child in those several days before birth as he 
is those several days after.”143 The appellee brief in support by the Diocesan 
Attorneys reflects similar conclusions. After providing their own scientific 
data, they conclude it: 
Emphasizes [the unborn’s] individuality; its functional unity; its independent 
life; its striving, developing nature; its containment of all that it will ever be 
essentially in every cell, in every generally human attribute, and in every 
individual attribute; its mental growth from as early as the fourth week after 
conception; its ability to move its legs, feet, toes, fists, thumbs, head, and lips 
by the twelfth week of its existence; its ability to hear and recognize its 
mother’s voice in the fifth month of its existence . . . .144 
The Diocesan Attorneys argued all this combined with the judgment made by 
the Founding Fathers, their citizen peers in the Common Law, and 
philosophers of natural rights required the unborn be recognized as a human 
person.145 Each brief for the appellee supported a recognition of the biological 
humanity of the unborn. What was argued in 1971 continues to be supported in 
2015. 
Author William May notes in his book Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of 
Human Life that modern science recognizes the biological identity of a new 
human individual is present in the zygote resulting from fertilization.146 The 
fusion of egg and sperm has two effects; first, by introducing paternally 
derived molecules into the network of maternally derived molecules, it initiates 
a new structure, an entirely new system or organism.147 Before fertilization, the 
egg is a structured collection of inert molecules awaiting activation with a 
lifespan around twenty-four hours once it is expelled from the ovary.148 The 
egg cannot maintain itself and soon depletes its energy source.149 Fertilization, 
however, “triggers a change in the dynamics of the egg by reorganizing and 
reactivating the interconnected network of inert maternal molecules in its 
contents . . . trigger[ing] the chain of reactions and molecular interactions that 
drive cell division and differentiation.”150 
“If left alone, this self-driven, self-perpetuating process of molecular 
interactions will continue for nine months and beyond, transforming the living 
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system called an embryo into the living system called a . . . baby” May cites.151 
Directly quoting the author of the article, May notes: 
Whereas the living system before fertilization only had a lifespan of twenty-
four hours, the new living system after fertilization now has a span of seventy 
or eighty [years] for those who are strong. Furthermore, since this new system 
is capable of independent and self-sustaining existence, it is an organism. 
Fertilization is the paradigmatic example of cell-to-organism transition.152 
When an individual human begins to exist is a biological or scientific question, 
not a moral one.153 
Professor Lugosi similarly relies on science in defining ‘person,’ noting 
biology supplies the lowest common denominator of agreement between 
reasonable people.154 Human embryology is so advanced there is no doubt a 
new human being is created at the time of conception.155 Once the zygote has 
been formed, there is a new organism, different from the two gametes taken 
separately, but . . . the same individual organism as the adult into whom it later 
develops.156 A law must conform to the objective truth of science, so the 
meanings of ‘person’ and human being are identical in both law and science.157 
Yet Justice Blackmun in Roe evaded determining when life began, claiming 
the judiciary could not decide until professionals in medicine, philosophy, and 
theology could arrive at a consensus.158 Conveniently, this allows the judiciary 
to put off such a determination indefinitely if the Court is so inclined, because 
disagreement exists on the biological humanness of the unborn, despite clear 
proof to the contrary. And as long as disagreement exists the Court can claim a 
lack of consensus and wash its hands of the matter, rather than seek the truth. 
The above sources, from the appellee briefs in Roe presenting 
embryological data, conclusively support the biological fact that a new human 
being exists from conception. Though it may be that when Roe was handed 
down there was some question as to how conception occurred, no such 
argument can be made today by a rational person. Conception is not an 
ongoing process and human life beginning at conception is not a theory. 
B. Moral Approaches 
The final persuasive support for the unborn being recognized as persons 
rests with a moral argument. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in 
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upholding the central holding of Roe, proclaimed the judiciary’s obligation was 
to define the liberty of all, not mandate its own moral code.159 Later the 
Justices refer to the importance of precedent, that rule of law under the 
Constitution places precedent in an indispensable place.160 To overrule 
precedent would require a series of factors to be met: is the precedent’s central 
rule unworkable, would the stability of society be damaged by removal of the 
precedent, has society moved beyond the precedent, and whether the premises 
of fact have changed since the laying of that precedent so as to be 
unrecognizable and irrelevant to the issue it addressed?161 
The Justices elaborate that to have overruled Roe would reach an 
unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis and would have seriously 
weakened the Supreme Court’s ability to exercise the judicial power necessary 
for a nation dedicated to the rule of law.162 The Supreme Court must act in a 
manner which allows the people to see the Court’s decisions as grounded in 
principle and not the result of social or political pressures.163 The Justices 
conclude it is a constitutional liberty of a woman to have some freedom to 
terminate her pregnancy, and that the basic decision in Roe was based on a 
constitutional analysis the Court could not repudiate.164 This basic holding of 
Roe being the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability, was 
now a rule of law and a component of liberty the court cannot renounce.165 
Professor Lugosi provides a counterpoint to the rule of law reasoning by 
the Casey court. He writes: 
The ideal of the ‘rule of law’ is to live in a democratic society that places 
constitutional limits on the power of government, permanently protects 
inalienable human rights and fundamental freedoms from undue 
encroachment, and provides equality before laws administered by an 
independent judiciary.166 
In contrast, rule by law is the antithesis of a society practicing rule of law; rule 
by law is the state where the government exercises arbitrary powers and 
abridges at will the inalienable civil rights of any human being.167 Justice is the 
defining feature in a rule of law society, whereas deferential, coerced 
obedience is the defining feature in a rule by law society.168 
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Professor Lugosi notes his definition of rule of law is not accepted in some 
legal circles,169 and argues the Court’s definition of rule of law in Casey is 
opposite to his own.170 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter believed to 
overturn Roe would damage the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the rule 
of law,171 but Professor Lugosi asserts “legitimacy is derived by comporting to 
the Constitution, and not by acting as a non-elected super-legislature, caving 
into political pressure or exercising personal predilections.172 Similarly, 
William May points out civil law is subordinate to natural law, and the state 
has the obligation to protect the weak from the strong.173 Lugosi cited the 
proposition that “[A]lthough religion, law and morals can be separated, they 
are nevertheless still very much dependent on each other. Without religion 
there can be no morality: and without morality there can be no law.”174 
Penned only a few years after the decision in Casey, the Catholic Church 
document Evangelium Vitae presents a pertinent religious commentary on law 
and democracy. In it, Pope St. John Paul II wrote, “Democracy cannot be 
idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for 
immorality.”175 The value of democracy rises or falls with the values it 
embodies and promotes.176 “The basis of these values cannot be provisional 
and changeable ‘majority’ opinions,” the former pontiff expressed, “but only 
the acknowledgement of an objective moral law which, as the ‘natural law’ 
written in the human heart, is the obligatory point of reference for civil law 
itself.”177 
It is conceded the purpose of civil law is more limited in scope than that of 
the moral law, but the “civil law must ensure that all members of society enjoy 
respect for certain fundamental rights which innately belong to the ‘person’, 
rights which every positive law must recognize and guarantee.”178 The 
foremost of these rights is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human 
being.179 Pope St. John Paul II reaches back to St. Thomas Aquinas, a Doctor 
and philosopher of the Catholic Church to enumerate: 
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[H]uman law is law inasmuch as it is in conformity with right reason and thus 
derives from the eternal law. But when a law is contrary to reason, it is called 
an unjust law, but in this case it ceases to be a law and becomes instead an act 
of violence.180 
The Catholic Church recognizes the fundamental right and source of all other 
rights is the right to life, and laws legitimizing the direct killing of innocent 
human beings through abortion or euthanasia are in complete opposition to the 
inviolable right to life proper to every individual.181 Pope St. John Paul II 
warned that without an objective moral grounding, not even democracy is 
capable of ensuring a stable peace, especially since peace not built upon the 
dignity of every human individual frequently proves illusory.182 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Blackmun’s interpretation that ‘person’ did not include the unborn 
in the Constitution was incorrectly determined. The appellee briefs submitted 
by Henry Wade and the Diocesan Attorneys provided ample evidence of 
originalist, textual, and biological evidence supporting the personhood of the 
unborn. Behavior by the states to provide protections beyond the Fourteenth 
Amendment indicate the personhood of the unborn is still contested forty-two 
years later. Twenty-seven states as of last year restricted abortions to such an 
extent the Guttmacher Institute deemed them hostile to Roe’s provided 
abortion rights. Embryological data, readily available to interested parties, 
insists human life begins at conception. 
The pertinent point is not whether facts have changed but whether the facts 
as they have always existed will be recognized. For many years it was thought 
the sun orbited the earth. For many years it was thought life did not exist in the 
womb until quickening. That many people erroneously believed the sun orbited 
the earth did not make them right. What is right as to the unborn must be 
recognized. 
The legal fiction that the unborn are not ‘persons’ and receive no rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, while benefiting from state provided 
protections, proves inconsistent. Either the unborn are persons and deserve 
protection in every area of the law, or they are not and the states must be 
forever barred from providing protections to the unborn. Of these two paths the 
former is the one right and just. Just law will not reign until the Court properly 
recognizes “all men are created equal  .  .  .  are  endowed by their Creator with 
 
 180. Paulus PP. II, supra note 16, at point 72 (citing St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae 
I–II, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2um). 
 181. Paulus PP. II, supra note 16, at point 72. 
 182. Id. at 70. 
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certain inalienable rights,” and foremost among these rights is the right to life, 
without which no other right matters. 
WILLIAM R. AVERY* 
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